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ABSTRACT 
Interest in green technology in aviation is increasing.  To 
address environmental issues, novel fuels such as cryogenic 
liquid hydrogen (LH2) are being explored, however there are 
safety concerns.  This work combines safety studies to explore 
LH2 fuel safety for civil aviation. Preliminary hazard analyses 
(PHAs) (utilizing over 70 standards and guides) have been 
performed identifying possible LH2 hazards on-board aircraft.  A 
PHA has also been produced, with industry stakeholder 
involvement, to understand the major concerns for LH2 use at 
airports.  
Gaps in fundamental knowledge and LH2 technology have 
been identified, and two of these explored.  Firstly, work has 
been started to understand the fundamental flammability of 
hydrogen in altitude conditions. Secondly, FLACS CFD 
modelling has been used to simulate large-scale LH2 pool 
releases to examine behavior and predict pool size, downwind 
flammable regions, and flammable mass clouds formed for 
different environmental conditions and release scenarios. This 
has identified significant effects of wind speed on buoyancy and 
flammable cloud travel which must be taken into account of any 
hydrogen fuel facility design.  
This work (part of the EC funded ENABLEH2 project) is 
some of the first in over a decade to re-examine the safety of 
hydrogen propulsion in aircraft.  This process has identified 
wide-ranging issues that must be addressed before hydrogen 
propulsion can be introduced in civil aviation.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Civil aviation contributes to economic development that 
helps to raise living standards around the globe. However, the 
acceptability of further growth in air traffic is increasingly 
challenged because of its effects on the environment. Major 
concerns include the impact of engine exhaust emissions on 
global warming, on the ozone layer, and on human health. 
Existing environmental legislation covers engine emissions 
of oxides of nitrogen (NOx), carbon monoxide, unburned 
hydrocarbons and particulates. Aero engines must meet specified 
limits for operation around airports, as these are pollutants that 
can aggravate respiratory diseases. However, the Advisory 
Council for Aviation Research and Innovation in Europe has set 
more ambitious goals for emissions reduction per passenger 
kilometer over entire flights. Targets in its Strategic Research 
and Innovation Agenda (SRIA) ‘Flightpath 2050’ include 75% 
CO2 and 90% NOx emissions reductions by 2050 relative to new 
aircraft in service in year 2000 [1]. Other targets for aviation 
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include arresting the growth in CO2 emissions by 2020 and 
halving that figure by 2050.  
Attention is now also shifting towards addressing the overall 
impact of aviation on climate, including radiative forcing by all 
greenhouse gas emissions, contrails and contrail-induced 
cloudiness. The energy efficiency of new commercial aircraft 
and engines continues to increase, but these ongoing 
improvements are expected to be outweighed by the projected 
growth in global air travel.  
Therefore, to meet the CO2 emissions targets from 2021 
onwards, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
is launching a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA) [2]. Offsetting aviation CO2 
emissions is currently the most cost-effective means of meeting 
the CO2 targets and is permitted under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) established by the Kyoto Protocol. Airline 
flights wholly within the European Economic Area are already 
required to purchase carbon credits in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS).  
The special report of the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) issued in October 2018 [3] advised that to limit 
global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, net-zero 
CO2 emissions should be achieved by 2050 and that a 45% 
reduction from 2010 levels should be achieved by 2030. Similar 
reductions in non-CO2 emissions including methane and soot 
would also be required, and beyond 2050 it might still be 
necessary to achieve net-negative CO2 emissions, or take other 
measures to reduce radiative forcing, in order to avoid any 
further temperature increase.  
The independent UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
has endorsed the IPCC recommendations and advocated far 
reaching changes in energy use for heating, industry and 
transportation [4]. Replacing gas boilers with heat pumps and 
using electric road vehicles would significantly reduce CO2 
emissions, but emissions from aviation were harder to reduce.  
If aviation grows as anticipated in scenario studies 
commissioned by the CCC from Energy Systems Catapult [5], 
the proportion of average UK household CO2 emissions 
attributable to air travel could increase to 46% in 2050, from 12% 
in 2017. This assumes net-zero UK emissions would be achieved 
and air travel only grows by 20%.   New carbon sinks must be 
created to compensate for UK household emissions in order to 
achieve net-zero CO2, e.g. by reforesting UK farmland or 
restoring wetlands [4].  
If these targets are to be met, the cost of genuinely offsetting 
aviation’s CO2 emissions in 2050 must rise significantly. This 
increases the incentive for the industry itself to reduce net CO2 
emissions, despite the difficulty. The development of battery 
powered aircraft recharged by electricity generated by nuclear 
power or renewables only offers a partial solution; as these will 
only be feasible for ranges below about 1000 km, even with the 
development of advanced 800 Wh/kg battery technology [6].  
Alternative non-fossil fuels will be needed for longer-range 
aircraft in order to make significant reductions in CO2 emissions. 
These fuels may include biofuels derived from organic matter 
that has already extracted CO2 from the environment. Various 
feedstocks have been used to produce biofuels for aviation and 
these are generally blended 50/50 with kerosene to provide a 
drop-in replacement for Jet A-1. However, existing biofuels are 
expensive, and their production cycle is not entirely CO2-free.  
Until now only a minute proportion of airline flights have 
used biofuels, and it will be very difficult to ramp-up production 
to cope with the potential demand. Nevertheless, drop-in 
replacement biofuels may be part of the solution, particularly for 
the existing fleet of commercial aircraft and engines. 
Synthetic ‘electro-fuels’ are alternatives to biofuels. 
Hydrogen (H2) and CO2 obtained by Direct Air Capture, or from 
carbonates in sea water, can be converted to hydrocarbons by 
means of the reverse water-gas shift reaction and the Fisher–
Tropsch processes. Several projects aim to bring down the cost 
of such fuels, but even with inexpensive electricity from 
renewable sources these fuels are likely to remain relatively 
expensive on account of the high capital costs involved. 
Pure hydrogen is the simplest electro-fuel and is the most 
energy efficient to generate. It also has higher specific energy 
than any hydrocarbon fuel. In the long term the electrolysis of 
water may be the most economical way to produce large 
quantities of hydrogen, but it might also be generated via a series 
of thermo-chemical reactions driven by concentrated solar power 
or high-temperature nuclear reactors. Today most hydrogen is 
produced from natural gas with CO2 as a by-product. In the near-
term the CO2 may be sequestrated to make hydrogen production 
CO2 neutral. Alternatively, bio-methane might be used to 
produce the hydrogen. Sequestering, the CO2 could then make 
the overall fuel cycle CO2 net-negative to gain carbon credits for 
aviation. 
Hydrogen is now being used as an ultra-clean fuel in trains, 
busses and other automotive applications. It is also used by fuel 
cells in a few experimental light aircraft. In these applications 
the hydrogen is stored as a highly compressed gas (GH2), but its 
low density means that the pressure vessels used to store it are 
very much heavier than the gas they contain. This may be just 
acceptable for very efficient aircraft with ranges of up to about 
2000 km. However, liquid hydrogen (LH2) has higher density, so 
much larger quantities can be stored at low pressure in lighter 
tanks. This gives LH2-fuelled aircraft the potential for unlimited 
point-to-point range. For these reasons, liquid hydrogen has long 
been considered an attractive fuel for future commercial aircraft.  
 
2. HISTORY 
LH2-aircraft research has proceeded intermittently for more 
than sixty years. In 1957 the NACA flew a twin-engine B-57 
with a Curtis Wright J-65 turbojet modified to run on hydrogen, 
but it only switched to hydrogen at cruise. LH2 was contained in 
one wing-tip tank which was initially pressurized using helium 
gas from the other wing-tip tank. (Using helium to pressurize the 
hydrogen tanks would be unacceptable in future commercial 
aircraft because helium is a finite and non-renewable resource.)   
Pratt & Whitney began development of the 'Model 304' 
afterburning turbojet with an 'expander cycle' where a geared fan 
was driven by a hydrogen turbine, but the proposed application, 
the Mach 2.5 Lockheed CL-400 reconnaissance aircraft, was 
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cancelled and the engine development ceased. Other early US 
studies considered hypersonic aircraft where cryofuels would 
have been essential for airframe and engine cooling.  
In the 1970s NASA funded studies into hydrogen-fueled 
aircraft at Lockheed and elsewhere. Based on NASA reports, the 
Lockheed studies were described in detail by Brewer [7]. These 
studies considered a scenario where oil was in short supply and 
aircraft fuels would be produced from coal. This meant synthetic 
kerosene, methane and hydrogen would have similar costs for a 
given energy content. Today it is considered unlikely that oil 
supplies will run-out in the 21st century, so any transition to 
cryofuels will only be driven by environmental considerations. 
In the USSR, Tupolev researched subsonic transport aircraft 
applications. In the late 1980s the Tu-155 flew with one engine 
running on LH2 and later it was modified to run on LNG or 
methane.  Then about 20 years ago Airbus led the ‘Cryoplane’ 
project which looked at a wide range of subsonic LH2 aircraft 
designs. The 400-passenger long-range study aircraft had 
significantly reduced maximum take-off weight relative to a 
kerosene fueled design but had a big increase in empty weight 
on account of its large hydrogen tanks [8]. It was very similar to 
the earlier Lockheed design. However, projecting aircraft and 
engine technologies forward to 2050, it is anticipated that more-
efficient aircraft and engine designs should significantly reduce 
the amount of LH2 required for the same mission. 
The Cryoplane study was not immediately followed-up 
because of the cost of LH2 and the lack of any strong imperative 
to switch to a radically different fuel. However, climate change 
is now seen as a more urgent issue and threat to business-as-usual 
aviation growth and technology development. Also, given recent 
dramatic reductions in the cost of electricity produced by solar 
panels and wind turbines, it is now more credible that LH2 will 
become an economically viable electrofuel for future aircraft.  
However, there are still concerns around the safety of liquid 
hydrogen, and, as with any new technology, particularly in a 
safety-critical industry like aviation, a significant amount of 
work is needed to integrate it safely into the existing industry and 
infrastructure.  
This work brings together a series of studies carried out to 
examine the impact that hazards associated with liquid hydrogen 
will have on the civil aviation industry have as part of the 
ENABLEH2 project.  The gaps in technology and knowledge, 
which currently serve to act as a barrier to hydrogen adoption for 
the industry-at-large, have been identified, and work has begun 
to start to address these areas of need. 
 
3. HYDROGEN SAFETY 
A switch to a cryogenic fuel, such as liquid hydrogen or 
methane, has significant implications for the aviation industry: 
for aircraft manufacturers, fuel producers and suppliers and the 
supporting infrastructure at airports. Currently fuel for civil 
aviation is generally the kerosene-based liquid Jet-A, Jet-A1 or 
similar; a liquid that is often supplied from multiple pipelines in 
a network to maintain high volumes needed by airports with the 
required redundancy.  Cryogenic liquid hydrogen would require 
significantly different storage (at -250°C). Options for fuel 
supply that could be explored are piping in as a gas and 
liquefying at the airport, piping in the liquid itself, or possibly 
production and liquefaction on-site.  However, aside from the 
very low temperature hydrogen has properties that are quite 
different to those of hydrocarbon liquid fuels.  
Hydrogen is far more buoyant and prone to dispersion than 
hydrocarbon fuels. This means that systems for LH2 and GH2 
may need to be very different to current systems, designed to deal 
with leaks of liquid fuels that fall downwards, and vaporize at a 
low level. They will need to meet requirements to deal with a 
rapidly vaporizing fuel which will rise upwards far more quickly. 
Hydrogen also has wide flammability envelope and relative 
ease of ignition. The flash point of Kerosene is 38-66°C.  It won’t 
form a flammable atmosphere above the liquid surface until 
reaching that temperature, and when it does the flammable 
region is approx. 0.5-5% in air. While any release of hydrogen 
has the capability to form an explosive atmosphere  and can be 
ignited at approx. 4-75% in air at STP.   
Hydrogen flames have a lower effective radiative output due 
to the release of  thermal radiation being primarily due to excited 
water molecules (rather than CO2 and soot as is the case with 
hydrocarbons) and the effect of humidity in the surrounding 
atmosphere which (being composed of water molecules) can 
absorb a significant fraction of the radiation produced [9]. 
This differing behavior of hydrogen relative to the more 
conventional hydrocarbon fuels means that designs, processes 
and standards are all likely to have to change to support its 
introduction.   
 
3.1 Liquid Hydrogen Safety 
Liquid hydrogen use and safety have been examined 
reasonably extensively for use across industry with a number of 
studies resulting to enable safe use [10,11,12]. Few studies have 
examined this fuel for use in aviation. Brewer (1991) [7] 
examined the safety on liquid hydrogen in terms of crash 
survivability showing that the dispersion in a catastrophic event 
would provide safety benefits over Jet fuel.  There is also some 
benefit from lower thermal output should the fuel catch fire 
Khandelwal et al. (2013) [13].   
Schmidtchen et al. (1997) [15], also examine hydrogen 
safety for both aircraft and airports.  While they identify some 
areas that still require engineering and science solutions and 
specific areas of concern for designers, they determine that the 
use of the fuel should not be dismissed on the basis of safety. 
Some other studies have examined some specific components.  
The importance of fuel tank design and placement has also been 
discussed as a key safety design [13, 16].  All of these studies 
have concluded that the safety of the aviation industry should not 
be adversely affected by hydrogen fuel introduction, if the 
relevant standards and technology are developed. Benson et al 
(2019) [14] carried out an extensive PHA process for liquid 
hydrogen propulsion systems, highlighting a significant number 
of hazards, and more importantly the gaps that are still acting as 
barriers to this technology introduction, from both fundamental 
science and engineering technology development perspectives.   
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TABLE 1: A SUMMARY OF MAJOR HAZARDS 
ASSOCIATED WITH LIQUID HYDROGEN SYSTEMS ON 
BOARD AIRCRAFT (Benson et al 2019 [14]) 
Hazard 
categories 
Storage Heat management/ 
transport 
Temperature Cryogenic hazards 
to people and 
equipment, 
expansion/ damage 
effects from heat 
input 
Cryogenic hazards to 
people/equipment, 
expansion/ damage 
effects from heat 
input, the formation 
of highly flammable 
hydrogen-oxygen or 
oxygen ‘slush’ 
around leaks/ at cold 
surfaces. 
Pressure Expansion from 
heat increases, 
backflow of 
contaminated/ 
higher pressure 
stream 
Expansion from heat 
increases, ingress of 
air forming a 
flammable 
atmosphere 
Chemical Contamination 
causing blockages 
or oxidation, ortho-
para conversion 
causing increased 
expansion, leaks of 
flammable/ 
cryogenic 
materials, 
compatibility of 
materials (e.g. 
embrittlement). 
Contamination 
causing blockages or 
oxidation, ortho-para 
conversion causing 
increased expansion, 
leaks of flammable/ 
cryogenic materials, 
compatibility of 
materials (e.g. 
embrittlement). 
Mechanical System damage 
from sloshing, 
Impact, vibration, 
and strain 
System damage from 
thermoacoustic 
oscillation of liquid/ 
gas fuel, fluid-
hammer, impact, 
vibration and strain 
Leak/ spill Cryogenic hazards 
to people and 
equipment, 
flammable hazards 
from the formation 
of a flammable 
atmosphere 
Cryogenic hazards to 
people and 
equipment, 
flammable hazards 
from the formation of 
a flammable 
atmosphere  
Physiological Burns (cold, heat), 
asphyxiation 
Burn (cold, heat), 
asphyxiation 
 
Table 1 summarizes the hazards identified in that work 
related directly to liquid hydrogen. As liquid hydrogen moves 
through the propulsion system it is gasified. If fuel escapes from 
the liquid system, it is highly likely it will evaporate on release. 
As such Table 2 summarizes the hazards related to gaseous 
hydrogen that will be relevant to LH2 in those scenarios. 
TABLE 2: A SUMMARY OF MAJOR HAZARDS 
ASSOCIATED WITH GASEOUS HYDROGEN SYSTEMS 
ON BOARD AIRCRAFT (Benson et al 2019 [14]) 
Hazard 
categories 
Heat management/ 
transport 
Combustion 
Temperature Properties effect  Properties effect  
Pressure Expansion from heat 
increases, ingress of 
air forming a 
flammable 
atmosphere 
Importance of 
maintaining 
temperature to 
support combustion 
Chemical Leaks of flammable 
materials, and 
compatibility of 
materials (e.g. 
embrittlement). 
Leaks of flammable 
materials, and 
compatibility of 
materials (e.g. 
embrittlement). 
Mechanical System damage from 
impact, vibration, 
strain 
System damage from 
impact, vibration, 
strain, and 
thermoacoustic 
oscillation in 
combustors  
Leak/ spill Flammable hazards 
from the formation 
of a flammable 
atmosphere 
Flammable hazards 
from the formation of 
a flammable 
atmosphere 
Physiological Burn (hot) Burn (hot) 
Fire/ 
Explosion 
Confined explosion, 
danger of 
deflagration to 
detonation transition 
in event of ignition 
Flameout risk and 
ensuring re-ignition, 
Danger of 
deflagration to 
detonation transition 
in event of ignition 
 
A gap analysis based on this assessment identified the 
following areas of need (Benson et al 2019 [14]):  
• Effect of aircraft motion (vibration, strain) on H2 systems 
• Effect of flight profile & aviation conditions (pressure/ 
temperature) on H2 systems 
• H2 Flammability in aviation conditions 
• Ignition of H2 by different stimuli in aviation conditions  
• Fuel tank design and protection 
• Danger of deflagration to detonation transition (DDT)  
• Prevent flameout and ensuring re-ignition  
• Fire and explosion protection for the aircraft (fire 
suppression, inerting, ventilation, venting).  
The ENABLEH2 project intends to examine and fill as 
many of these gaps as possible. 
 
3.3 Fundamental studies in hydrogen flammability  
A serious knowledge gap identified by the initial literature 
survey and PHA process is the definition of ignition and 
flammability characteristics for hydrogen under various aviation 
operating conditions.  
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The flammability of hydrogen in low temperatures has been 
studied to a reasonable degree due to the use of cryogenic 
hydrogen in industry [12].  Wierzba et al (1992) [17] extended 
work examining hydrogen flammability at temperatures from 
−60°C  to −100°C, and recently Panda & Hecht (2017) [18] 
explored ignition and flammability of cryogenic hydrogen 
exploring  jet flame behavior for a range of release scenarios 
from 37 K to 295 K. Kuznetsov et al (2015) also looked at the 
effects of a variety of test parameters [19].  
Relatively few studies have examined the flammability of 
hydrogen in low-pressure environments. Rehn (2014) [20] 
examined the flammability of hydrogen in a 20 L vessel, at air 
pressures from atmospheric down to approx. 186 mbar 
(replicating pressures found at altitudes of 40,000 ft), finding a 
general widening of a flammability envelope with decreasing 
pressures.  With a 3% pressure rise criterion, the lower 
flammability limit (LFL) was found to be 3.89% hydrogen at 
pressures replicating 40,000 feet (reduced from 4.70% hydrogen 
at atmospheric pressure). The upper flammability limit (UFL) 
was found to be 78.18% hydrogen at sea level, decreasing to 
76.87% at 40,000 feet.  Kuznetsov et al (2012) [21] examined 
hydrogen flammability in an 8 L vessel, at pressures between 
25 mbar and 1000 mbar, with upper flammability limits 
changing to 78% H2 between 200 mbar and 500 mbar, although 
for an initial pressure of 1000 mbar it was found to be only 76%. 
Some work had been previously performed by Jones (2009) [22] 
however the spark energy used (at 5000 V) was far below the 
higher energies used in, for example, explosion standard tests 
[23] and other studies, and are thus not comparable. 
Even less work appears to have been done investigating the 
fundamental flammability and ignition properties of hydrogen 
under the combined circumstances of low pressure and low 
temperature. In fact, the authors of this work cannot locate any 
publication studying this subject. And yet, in order to understand 
the behavior of hydrogen and the risks associated with it, it is 
absolutely necessary that these properties are defined.  The 
information is needed to inform ignition prediction, and 
explosion prevention and mitigation, assessment and strategies. 
The extreme conditions found at altitude will be explored by 
the authors of this work, in a novel experimental rig as part of 
the EC ENABLEH2 project over the next 2 years. It will operate 
at down to 150 mbar pressure and -50°C.  The work will explore 
flammability fundamentals such as flame speed, minimum 
ignition energies, and other key safety parameters. 
 
3.2 Hydrogen at airports 
For airports there have been very few studies examining 
liquid hydrogen safety.  The use of hydrogen in the gaseous form 
has been relatively well examined as airports expand their use of 
hydrogen technologies for ground-based operations [24, 25, 26].  
The safety of liquid hydrogen at airports has also been examined 
from a storage perspective to support these activities [27], but 
the volume involved was substantially less than that needed to 
support civil aviation. The work around airports and liquid 
hydrogen generally focuses on fuel supply, without a safety 
focus however Schmidtchen et al. (1997) [15] performed a safety 
examination of airports, settling on liquefaction at airports with 
underground pipes supplying aircraft.  While this piped approach 
may be sensible in the long term, a transitional period might not 
allow this process, and fueling might have to be performed by 
tanker vehicles, meaning different refueling scenarios and risks.  
They make an excellent point in that odorizing additives would 
likely be extremely difficult to use at the cold temperatures (due 
to solidification) so alternative methods would be needed for 
detection.  They also identify further work being needed to 
explore the scale of storage and leaks.   The Preliminary hazard 
analysis [28] method has been applied in this paper to airport 
safety, to explore the use of liquid hydrogen at airports, and the 
alterations and mitigations that might be needed to enable this 
cryogenic and flammable fuel to be used in this complex and 
fast-moving environment.  The method and results can be found 
later in this paper.   
It is also necessary to improve understanding of the large-
scale hazards that could be posed by liquid hydrogen in aviation 
accident scenarios, such as leaks from airport fuel storage tanks. 
Some large-scale trials have been performed examining 
dispersion [19 29, 30] but only cover a restricted range of 
scenarios.  Recent advances in modelling capability and 
improved validation for hydrogen releases, enable the use of 
state-of-the-art dispersion/explosion CFD software to be used to 
examine a range of release scenarios. FLACS 3D CFD software 
has integrated modules for ventilation/dispersion, and explosion 
modelling, with a good degree of accuracy/validation for 
modelling gaseous explosion over a wide range of scenarios and 
particularly for modelling hydrogen releases/explosions 
(underpinned an extensive publication record in this area, 
including FLACS application to LH2 releases [31]). The FLACS 
CFD code has therefore been applied in this work to model large-
scale liquid hydrogen spills and associated flammable gas cloud 
behavior (e.g. the effect of wind speed and ground substrate type 
on the extent of the flammable cloud generated). However 
further work is needed to use these validated tools to explore 
scenarios at airports, and around production and storage 
installations. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
The following section details work carried out in order to 
assess hazards associated with hydrogen fuel use at airports.  For 
the first part of this work a PHA process has been used to identify 
hazards when liquid hydrogen fuel is assessed across a range of 
categories, chosen by aviation industry, fire and hydrogen 
professionals.  The gaps in knowledge and technology were also 
highlighted by this process.  The second part of the work starts 
to develop one of the identified hazards and knowledge gaps; the 
lack of understanding on large scale hydrogen release and 
dispersion.  This gap is being explored as it links a number of 
different hazard scenarios for storage and production 
installations, and aircraft tank breach through collision or crash, 
as well as aiding emergency responders to understand the 
behavior of hazards they may face in a hydrogen release 
scenario.    
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4.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis work for liquid 
hydrogen use at airports  
The PHA is often the first stage of a risk assessment process.  
As it is performed in the early stages of a project it can often 
form the basis for later risk assessment methods.  Applying the 
US Department of Defense [28] approach, a panel of hydrogen 
experts and aviation/ airport stakeholders was convened 
including: 
• Airport operator 
• Fire & rescue service 
• Liquid hydrogen provider 
• Aircraft & engine manufacturers 
• Aviation system design experts 
Following discussions with the airport operator, Heathrow 
Airport Ltd, these experts were asked to assess a series of hazards 
under the following categories: 
• Storage and on-site generation 
• Firefighting 
• Fueling (and ground transport) 
• Taxiing 
• Take-off and landing 
A preliminary hazard list (PHL) was constructed by 
examining existing hazards, and the operational requirements 
that might be affected by the switch from hydrocarbon jet fuel to 
LH2.  In this case, hazards were judged as being anything that 
would affect the airport in terms of danger to life/ persons and 
property, or a significant interruption to airport operations.  
Scores ranged from 1 (extremely unlikely/ low impact) to 5 
(Highly likely/ catastrophic).  
Following these assessments, where scores had been given, 
the overall risk factor was calculated by multiplying the severity 
and likelihood scores together.  Where a range was given upper 
and lower risk factors were calculated.  The results of these 
calculations are show later in Figure 2.  
 
4.2 FLACS Liquid Hydrogen Pool Spill Simulations 
The numerical simulations were performed using the 
FLACS CFD model. FLACS was originally developed in the 
1980 and 90s for use in the Oil and Gas industry. It provides 
capabilities for carrying-out safety studies by simulating 
accident scenarios involving fluid flow behavior in complex 3D 
geometries by modelling flammable gas hazard effects such as 
the dispersion of flammable gases, gas explosions and pool/jet 
fires. 
FLACS is a structured Cartesian grid, finite volume CFD 
code. The code solves conservation equations for mass, 
momentum, enthalpy, mass fraction of chemical species, 
turbulent kinetic energy and dissipation rate of turbulent kinetic 
energy [32]. A standard k-ε turbulence model is utilized 
incorporating modifications for generation of turbulence behind 
sub-grid obstacles and turbulent wall functions. FLACS employs 
the Porosity/Distributed Resistance method to model the 
turbulence generated by sub-grid scale objects. This allows for 
the efficient simulation of gas dispersion behavior in complex 
geometries using relatively coarse numerical grids. Atmospheric 
boundary layer flows are modelled in FLACS by introducing 
profiles for wind velocity, temperature and turbulence on the 
flow inlet boundaries [32]. Buoyancy effects are accounted for 
by introducing additional source terms in the momentum and 
turbulence model equations. The model has been tested for a 
wide variety of scenarios including buoyant and dense gas 
releases [33,34]. 
The FLACS pool model allows the deposition and spread of 
a pool of liquid from a spill onto the ground to be simulated and 
the release source term to the gas dispersion model to be 
calculated. The model was originally developed for use with 
LNG spills but has also been applied to liquid hydrogen releases. 
The behavior of the spreading liquid pool is approximated by 
solving the shallow-water equations on a two-dimensional 
Cartesian grid along the ground and assuming that the pool 
properties are uniform across the height of the pool. Middha et 
al. [35] used the FLACS CFD (pool) model to simulate LH2 pool 
spread and gas cloud dispersion behavior for the NASA White 
Sands Experiments [36]. On the basis of their study, the authors 
concluded that the FLACS pool model provides an efficient and 
accurate tool for investigating accidental release scenarios 
involving cryogenic liquids such as LH2. 
 
Simulation details 
The initial validation simulations were performed on a 
domain 200 m × 60 m × 80 m in the X, Y and Z directions (-30 
m to 170 m, -30 m to 30 m, 0 to 80 m). The grid employed had a 
total of 177,284 cells (82 × 47 x 46 cells). In the pool region a 
grid cell size of 0.5 m was used in the X and Y directions and 
0.12 m in the Z direction. Outside this region the grid cell size 
was increased, by using an expansion factor of 1.2, and setting a 
maximum grid cell size of 4 m. The mesh employed in the 
FLACS simulations is shown in Figure 1. For some simulations 
the size of the domain and number of grid cells was increased, in 
the X-direction, to 400 m × 60 m × 80 m (82 × 47 × 46 - 285,384 
cells) to allow the simulation of higher wind speeds upon 
flammable cloud dispersion behavior. 
The ambient temperature was set to 15°C. The ground 
roughness length for the wind profile was set to 3 mm. The 
Pasquill stability class was set to class F – stable (produced best 
match in Middha et al. [35]) The pool model spill point was set 
at the origin (0, 0, 0). The inlet boundary (type WIND) was 
defined at 30 m upwind of this point. A pool fence, 0.6 m high, 
was defined at radius of 4.25 m from the spill point. The thermal 
conductivity and thermal diffusivity of the ground used in the 
pool model were set to 3.72 W/m.K and 1.45 × 10-6 m2/s, to 
replicate the thermal properties of wet coarse sand. 
The pool release was started after 10 seconds of simulation 
time to allow the wind field to become established. Liquid 
hydrogen in the pool model was released at 9.5 kg/s for a 
duration of 38 s. As a conservative assumption with regard to 
formation of liquid pool and subsequent dispersion behavior, it 
was further assumed that all of the LH2 release was deposited 
into the LH2 pool and that the effects of flash vaporization were 
neglected [35]. 
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FIGURE 1: AN EXAMPLE OF THE GEOMETRIC MODEL 
AND MESH USED IN THE FLACS SIMULATIONS. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section details the result from the Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) activity and the simulation work done to explore 
the hazard scenario of a large scale liquid hydrogen tank/ system 
breach. 
 
5.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis work for liquid 
hydrogen use at airports  
The following sections describe the major conclusions of the 
PHA activity including a broad description of hazard scores, 
mitigations and gaps identified.   
Figure 2 shows the risk factors for the hazards (the product 
of severity and likelihood scores, where scores, or a range of 
these, could be assigned by industry experts).  Error bars show 
the range of the risk factors calculated.  It is clear that post-
mitigation the risk factor for the majority of hazards falls, with 
experts believing it is possible to reduce the risk in these 
scenarios.  However, the size of the error bar tends to increase 
due to the lack of certainty, or existing technology and 
information on the engineering needed to enable the safe 
introduction of the changes or mitigations.  The most serious 
concerns, and scenarios with the highest risk factor (both pre- 
and post-mitigations), are in firefighting.  Storage and on-site 
generation category shows the most significant drop between 
pre- and post- mitigation assessment.  This is due to confidence 
of industry professionals that existing industry methods can be 
used, though all of the post-mitigation risk factors have a 
reasonably large range. The following sections contain a 
summary of each category for assessment.   
 
Storage and on-site generation 
On storage, the concerns featured around the interrelated 
hazards of fire, explosion cryogenic, over-pressure and leaks. 
Human error, integrity of asset, external impact, loss of power, 
control failure and sabotage were identified as possible causes of 
the events.  It was recognized that all of these hazards could 
result in severe or catastrophic events, though in almost all cases 
the likelihood was unlikely (score 1 or 2). Prevention strategies 
explored were maintenance (particularly in relation to over-
pressurization) emergency shutdown, separation, and improved 
designs and operating procedures. 
 
 
BLEVE =Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapor Explosion.  
 
FIGURE 2: A GRAPH SHOWING THE COMBINED RISK 
FACTORS FOR HAZARD IN USING LIQUID HYDROGEN 
FUEL AT AIRPORTS. 
 
The further work identified was the need to define storage 
size, the feasibility of on-site hydrogen generation and/or 
liquefaction, and a need to look at catastrophic hydrogen releases 
with detailed risk assessment work.  Industry professionals 
judged that with existing mitigations, and re-engineered systems, 
they were confident event likelihood could be reduced even 
further (0-1) with some reduction in severity outcomes (4).   
 8 © 2020 by ASME 
TABLE 3: SEVERITY AND LIKELIHOOD SCORES FOR 
HAZARD SCENARIOS IDENTIIFED IN A PRELIMINARY 
HAZARD ANALYSIS EXCERCISE 
 
Before 
prevention, 
alteration, 
mitigation 
After 
prevention, 
alteration, 
mitigation 
Hazard S L S L 
Storage and on-site generation 
Fire  4-5 2 4 0-1 
Explosion 4-5 1 4 0-1 
Cold 3-4 2 3 0-1 
Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapor 
Explosion (BLEVE) risk  
4-5 2 4 0-1 
Small Lean Tank LH2 incident 4-5 2 4 0-1 
Large tank LH2 incident 5 1 4 0-1 
Firefighting 
Lack of regulation 5 5 5 3 
Transportation 5 4 5 3 
Cordons 5 5 5 3 
Cryogenic liquid 5 3 5 1 
Flammable atmosphere 5 4 - - 
Fueling (and ground transport) 
Major release during refueling  5 2 - - 
Minor & short duration release during 
refueling  
2 5 - - 
Minor & long release during refueling 1-3 4 - - 
Pipe & fittings freeze collected/ 
ground water  
2 5 2 5 
Gas release though Pressure Safety 
Valve  
3 2 - - 
Gas cloud ignition 2-4 2-4 - - 
Taxiing 
Major Fuel tank leak 3-5 2 - - 
Small leak from foreign object strike 2-4 1 2-3 1 
Small leak from ground collision 2-5 1-2 2-5 1 
Take-off and landing 
Crash within airport 5 1 5 1 
S = Severity. L = Likelihood. - = an area where such a level of 
further work is required that experts could not assign scores. 
 
Firefighting 
Firefighting was an area where the most change appeared to 
be needed. Currently airports are assessed based on the 
calculated need for firefighting facilities (for example amount of 
foam).  Fire-fighting professionals pointed out this entire system 
of safety, risk assessment and regulatory classification and 
controls would have to change.  Hazard areas identified were 
lack of regulation, transportation concerns, cordon requirements, 
cryogenic and flammable hazards. All hazards were judged to be 
capable of catastrophic outcomes (score 5) with likelihood 
scores of 3-5.  A number of the mitigations or changes in practice 
were revealed to already exist (e.g. firefighting practices for 
dealing with cryogenic materials and the practically-invisible 
hydrogen flames, such as safe storage, respiratory protection, 
thermal imaging) however the level of mitigation needed 
resulted in likelihood scores being reduced to only 3 due to the 
amount of work still required to fill the gaps and integrate 
identified mitigations into existing fire and rescue organizations 
(severity scores remain unchanged as the event may still be 
catastrophic).  In terms of future work and changes it was judged 
by the experts that everything in terms of fire service operation 
would be affected.  Firefighting measures exist for liquid 
hydrogen, however the current processes require overhaul in 
relation to training, protective and firefighting equipment, 
cordons, and fire protection. A new regulatory regime is needed 
to be developed for the use of hydrogen at airports, and for the 
assessment of the airport requirements in terms of fire cover. 
 
Fueling (and ground transport) 
The major hazards here were identified as cryogenic and 
flammable in relation to an unwanted release. A number of 
modes were identified including mechanical failure, full-bore 
rupture, impact (on pipe, tank, aircraft), operator error, 
malfunctioning safety valves, a long stay on tarmac (leading to 
boil-off) and poor design.  Possible negative outcomes included 
physiological dangers to airport staff and users, local damage to 
vehicles and infrastructure, wider damage to infrastructure, and 
operational disruption. Freezing Pipes (to ground) or valves were 
judged as particularly likely hazards that need to be designed out.  
Severity ranged anywhere from 1 to 5 depending on the size of 
the leaks.  Prevention and mitigation actions included well-
designed procedures, possible use of robots or remote refueling, 
protective equipment leak detection, fire-detection systems and 
good designs of pipes, tanks and aircraft.  This was such a high 
level of further work that most hazards were not given a severity 
or likelihood score on the reassessment.  
 
Taxiing 
Again, general leak hazards, with increased hazard in the 
case of fire, was the primary concern.  Generally, the likelihood 
of events was judged to be relatively unlikely (1 or 2) with 
severity depending on whether a fire occurred, when a 
catastrophic score of 5 was given.  Prevention and mitigations 
were listed as robust tank design and protection, local fire 
suppression systems and control of ground traffic.  Post these 
mitigations, scores were unchanged without the new systems 
designs being in existence yet.   
 
Take-off and landing 
The only concern was a form of crash or heavy landing at 
the airport.  The severity of the incident was judged to be a 5, 
with a likelihood as 1.  This was unchanged, with mitigations 
largely due to the likely disruption to the airport, however 
specific mitigations were listed to introduce cordons and to 
assess whether evacuation would be the best option in such 
scenarios, i.e. depending on whether hydrogen had escaped, 
passengers remaining on the aircraft could be safer than 
evacuating towards the hazard. Hydrogen’s rapid dispersion and 
high buoyancy could be a benefit in this scenario. Further risk 
analysis work is needed on crash-worthiness, leaks and large 
volume hydrogen releases. 
One area identified in both on-board systems and airport 
PHA as requiring further work was the analysis of releases of 
large volumes of liquid hydrogen.  The following section details 
work that has been performed to examine this. 
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5.2 FLACS Liquid Hydrogen Pool Spill Simulations 
In order to improve understanding of the large-scale hazards 
that could be posed by LH2 in aviation accident scenarios, such 
as leaks from airport fuel storage tanks, numerical simulations 
have been performed to model the effect of wind speed and 
ground substrate type on the extent of the flammable cloud 
generated by large-scale LH2 pills and the associated flammable 
gas cloud behavior. 
 
Effect of Pool Ground Type 
Figure 3 shows a comparison between the flammable mass, 
flammable hydrogen cloud and LH2 pool size results predicted 
by FLACS for three pool model ground types – wet coarse sand, 
concrete and insulated (characterized in terms of thermal 
conductivity and thermal diffusivity values given in Table 4). 
 
TABLE 4: POOL MODEL GROUND PROPERTIES 
Ground Type Thermal 
Conductivity 
(W/m/K) 
Thermal 
Diffusivity 
(m2/s) 
Wet coarse sand 3.72 1.45 × 10-6 
Concrete 1.1 1.0 × 10-6 
Insulated 0.0 1030 
 
Both concrete and particularly the wet coarse sand have a 
relatively high thermal inertia, meaning that the ground takes 
longer to cool and so maintains greater temperature difference 
and rate of heat transfer to the LH2 pool. Hence the higher level 
of heat transfer from the concrete and particularly for the wet 
sand produces a much greater level of vaporization of the LH2 
pool (smaller maximum pool radius and shorter time to total 
vaporization), cloud dispersion and greater peak flammable mass 
and flammable extent but for a shorter duration. In contrast for 
the insulated pool, there is no heat transfer from the ground to 
the pool - which rapidly grows to the maximum size of the pool, 
thereafter resulting in a slow steady vaporization of the LH2 pool 
and producing a sustained long duration flammable cloud with a 
relatively low flammable mass and a smaller flammable extent. 
 
Effect of wind speed 
Figure 4 shows a comparison between the flammable mass 
and flammable hydrogen clouds predicted by FLACS for 
different wind speeds (on a wet sand ground type). At lower wind 
speeds the head of the cloud becomes buoyant rising away from 
the ground. At higher wind speeds the cloud becomes restricted 
to travelling along the ground, increasing the maximum 
downwind flammable distance and reducing the maximum 
flammable height reached. However, the level of dilution of the 
cloud also increases at higher wind speeds, with both the peak 
flammable mass and duration of the flammable cloud being 
reduced. This serves to limit the maximum flammable extent of 
the cloud. Thus, increasing the wind speed from 3.6 m/s to 6.3 
m/s has only a small effect on the maximum downwind 
flammable distance reached by the cloud. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: EFFECT OF POOL GROUND TYPE ON THE 
PREDICTED RESULTS FOR: (A) FLAMMABLE MASS VERSUS 
TIME; (B) POOL RADIUS VERSUS TIME; (C) MAXIMUM 
HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION OF FLAMMABLE CLOUD. 
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FIGURE 4: EFFECT OF WIND SPEED ON THE PREDICTED 
RESULTS FOR: (A) FLAMMABLE MASS VERSUS TIME; (B) 
MAXIMUM HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION CONTOUR PLOTS 
OF THE FLAMMABLE CLOUD. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This work combines multiple safety studies to explore the 
safety of liquid hydrogen fuel use for civil aviation. PHAs, 
utilizing over 70 sources, and in consultation with industry, are 
used to understand the hazards posed by liquid hydrogen use in 
civil aviation.     
For risks at airport the area with the highest risk factor 
(product of severity and likelihood scores) has been identified as 
firefighting, with scores up to 25 (out of a possible 25). The 
scores are relatively high for both pre-and post-mitigation 
assessments due to considerable work required to provide new 
regulation and integrate firefighting techniques. Storage and on 
site generation risk scores are also relatively high (up to 9 
average) however given there are existing methods to mitigate 
these hazards, following mitigation, risk factor averages fell to 
around 2. However, the range of these is wide given possible 
concerns over technology integration with new systems.  Most 
fueling hazards could not be assessed post mitigation due to the 
level of technology development required.  
Based on gaps relevant to multiple areas of aviation 
engineering highlighted by the PHA process, FLACS CFD 
modelling has been used in this work to simulate large scale LH2 
pool releases to examine their behavior and predict the LH2 pool 
size, downwind distance to LFL, and flammable mass of the 
hydrogen-air clouds formed for different environmental 
conditions and release scenarios.  
Using the model to examine the effect of different pool 
ground types, materials with a higher thermal conductivity (e.g. 
wet sand) were found to produce a cloud with a greater peak 
flammable mass and flammable extent, but for a shorter duration. 
At lower wind speeds the head of the cloud becomes 
buoyant rising away from the ground, while at higher wind 
speeds the cloud becomes restricted to travelling along the 
ground, increasing the downwind flammable distance. However, 
the level of dilution of the cloud also increases with wind speed, 
serving to limit the maximum flammable extent reached by the 
cloud. 
 
FUTURE WORK 
It has been found that little work has explored the 
combination effects of pressure and temperature on hydrogen 
flammability.  This will be addressed in future papers as part of 
this project.  
One key area identified in both on-board systems and airport 
PHA as requiring further work was the analysis of releases of 
large volumes of liquid hydrogen.  This was related to, inter alia, 
crash and damage scenarios, emergency release, and excessive 
boil-off in the event of delays.  This paper has explored some 
large scale release issues, however far more work, both 
modelling, and ideally experimental (though the cost and 
complexity of this work makes the opportunity challenging) are 
needed to better understand the behavior of catastrophic or large 
hydrogen releases in a range of scenarios.   
Other work identified as being required to introduce 
hydrogen specifically at airports included: 
• Fuller analysis of airport fuel volume supply, storage 
and liquefaction  
• Consideration on airport safety classifications, 
regulatory regime, and firefighting provision 
• Fueling system designs 
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